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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The issue in this case is whether a 1980 contract 
between the parties and a 1983 amendment thereto conveyed to 
American Cyanamid Company ("Cyanamid") perpetual rights to use 
the federal regulatory authority of Fermenta Animal Health 
Company ("Fermenta") to market an animal feed supplement.  
Cyanamid marketed the drug under the trademark Aureozol.  Before 
the district court, both sides maintained that these documents 
are unambiguous, although each side differed on what was 
unambiguously stated therein. The district court held that "the 
  
plain language of the 1980 agreement and the 1983 amendment," 
when read against the background of the parties' pre-contract 
negotiations and post-contract conduct, did not convey that 
right.  We will affirm.    
  
 I. 
 This dispute arises from a contract that was signed 
between Cyanamid, a chemical and pharmaceutical conglomerate, and 
Diamond Shamrock Corporation ("Diamond Shamrock") in 1980.  
Fermenta, the defendant in this case, became the successor in 
interest to Diamond Shamrock through an acquisition in 1985.  The 
purpose of the contract was to enable Cyanamid to produce and 
sell an animal feed drug that Diamond Shamrock had developed and 
was marketing.  The drug was an antibiotic animal feed supplement 
consisting of chlortetracycline, sulfathiazole, and penicillin, 
known as CSP 250.  As consideration, Diamond Shamrock would 
receive an advance royalty and future royalties from Cyanamid's 
sales. 
 In order for Cyanamid to manufacture and sell Diamond's 
product, the contract granted it two distinct rights.  First, 
Cyanamid was given access to Diamond Shamrock's proprietary 
information about its animal feed drug for the purpose of 
manufacturing and selling it.  Equally important, the agreement 
gave Cyanamid the right to reference Diamond Shamrock's 
regulatory authority to sell the drug.   
 The FDA licenses the sale in interstate commerce of 
animal drugs by approving a manufacturer's New Animal Drug 
  
Application (NADA), which remains on file with the FDA.  Through 
the NADA, the FDA approves both the properties of the drug and 
its place and method of manufacture.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a).  
In 1971, Diamond Shamrock had obtained FDA approval for a NADA 
for its animal feed drug.1 
 Obtaining a NADA can be an expensive and lengthy 
process because of the amount of resources that must be expended 
on researching and demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the 
proposed animal drug.  However, a company may be able to avoid 
the costs associated with obtaining its own NADA if it wishes to 
market a drug identical to that marketed by another company by 
requesting that company to allow it to reference the safety and 
efficacy data in its NADA.  The current NADA holder must apply to 
the FDA for a "supplemental NADA" to enable the other company to 
reference its original NADA. See 21 C.F.R. § 514.8(a)(4)(v).2 
 Cyanamid entered into this contract with Diamond 
Shamrock because its own animal drug, which competed in the 
                     
1
.  When Fermenta became the successor in interest to Diamond 
Shamrock's animal drug business, it acquired Diamond Shamrock's 
NADA authority, as noted in 21 C.F.R. § 558.15(g)(1). 
2
.  21 C.F.R. § 514.8(a)(4)(v) provides in part: 
 
 A communication proposing a change in a new 
animal drug application should provide for 
any one of the following kinds of changes: 
 . . .  
 
  (v) Provision for outside firm to 
participate in the preparation, distribution, 
or packaging of a new animal drug (new 
distributor, packer, supplier, manufacturer, 
etc.). 
  
market with Diamond Shamrock's CSP 250, was under scrutiny by the 
FDA for the possible carcinogenic effects of one of its 
components, sulfamethazine.  Cyanamid sought to "insure" itself 
in the event the FDA took adverse action against its existing 
animal product by expanding its own product line to include 
Diamond Shamrock's animal feed supplement.  Thus, in 1979, it 
entered negotiations with Diamond Shamrock, hoping to obtain the 
right to develop and sell Diamond Shamrock's product.  Since 
Cyanamid could not sell Diamond Shamrock's drug without federal 
regulatory authority, the agreement required Diamond Shamrock to 
prepare and file a supplemental NADA establishing Cyanamid's 
facility as an alternate manufacturing site and designating 
Cyanamid as a distributor of the drug.  In addition to pursuing 
an agreement with Diamond Shamrock, Cyanamid was formulating 
plans to obtain its own NADA for an animal product consisting of 
aureomycin, sulfathiazole and penicillin, a combination similar 
to CSP 250.  This was reflected in a letter sent from Cyanamid to 
Diamond Shamrock during the course of negotiations in December of 
1979. 
 Cyanamid and Diamond Shamrock executed their contract 
on July 23, 1980.  Diamond Shamrock obtained the supplemental 
NADA in June of 1982 and the original five year contract period 
commenced on that date.  Cyanamid thus enjoyed both commercial 
and regulatory rights to manufacture and sell the animal feed 
drug through June of 1987. 
  
  
 The contract also gave Cyanamid an option at the 
expiration of the agreement to purchase a perpetual license from 
Diamond Shamrock.  Article 9.2 provides in part: 
  Upon expiration of the full term of this 
Agreement . . . CYANAMID shall have the right 
to obtain a perpetual, paid-up, non-exclusive 
license, without right to sublicense, under 
TECHNICAL INFORMATION as shall have been 
licensed hereunder to CYANAMID upon the 
payment of twenty-five thousand ($25,000) 
dollars to DIAMOND SHAMROCK for such 
perpetual rights. 
 
App. 158.   
 The option described in Article 9.2 was exercised 
prematurely by the parties in 1983 in the form of an amendment to 
the agreement.  The amendment provides in part: 
  You will grant to us [Cyanamid] a 
perpetual paid-up nonexclusive license 
without right to sub-license under TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION as shall have been licensed under 
the Agreement upon our payment to you of 
$87,500 for such perpetual rights.  
 
 * * * * 
  
  All other terms and conditions of the 
Agreement will remain in effect. 
 
App. 165.  
 The dispute before us turns on whether this 1983 
amendment, when read together with the original contract, gives 
Cyanamid a perpetual right to reference Fermenta's regulatory 
authority to sell CSP 250.  Cyanamid argues that the 1983 
amendment gave it such a right, but Fermenta insists that such a 
right ceased in 1987 with the expiration of the original 
contract.  
  
 Fermenta acquired Diamond Shamrock's interest in the 
contract in October of 1985, and from then through 1993, Fermenta 
monitored Cyanamid's regulatory compliance with the NADA.  Prior 
to 1993, Fermenta never informed Cyanamid that its right to 
reference its NADA had expired with the termination of the 
original contract in 1987.  Fermenta claims not to have realized 
that the contract expired in June of 1987 until 1993, when 
Fermenta more closely examined the entire contract because of 
Cyanamid's alleged regulatory breaches associated with the 
supplemental NADA.  Fermenta thereupon demanded that Cyanamid pay 
it $500,000, agree to pay a 10 percent royalty on all sales, and 
grant it a paid-up, royalty-free license under any patent or NADA 
which Cyanamid may have obtained on any related product.  When 
Cyanamid refused to comply, Fermenta sent a letter to the FDA 
informing it that Cyanamid was no longer authorized to reference 
Fermenta's NADA.  
 In response to Fermenta's action, Cyanamid filed a 
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey seeking a preliminary injunction and a declaration that it 
held a perpetual, royalty-free license to reference the 
supplemental NADA so that it could continue to sell the product. 
Fermenta counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that Cyanamid's 
right to reference Fermenta's regulatory authority had expired in 
1987. The jurisdiction of the district court was based on 
diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
   After a one day evidentiary hearing at which it 
listened to extrinsic evidence of intent tendered by each side, 
  
the district court entered a declaratory judgment that Cyanamid 
"did not purchase a perpetual right to use the NADA or 
supplemental NADA."  Dist. Ct. Order, No. 93-4936 (entered June 
22, 1994).  In its opinion, the district court analyzed the 
structure and text of the original agreement and the amendment 
and concluded that they could not reasonably be read to convey to 
Cyanamid a perpetual right to utilize Diamond Shamrock's 
regulatory authority.  The court also concluded that the  
extrinsic evidence provided no basis for interpreting the scope 
of the rights conveyed by the agreements more broadly than the 
parameters of those rights as defined by its analysis of the 
structure and text. 
 We have conducted a plenary review of the district 
court's conclusions.  Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. 
Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1986) (plenary review 
conducted of district court's conclusion that term of contract 
read against the background of the relevant extrinsic evidence 
was unambiguous).  While our analysis of the structure and text 
of the agreement differs in one respect from that of the district 
court, that difference is not material for present purposes and 
our conclusions are the same as those reached by the district 
court.  
 
  
 II.    
 The district court exercised its diversity 
jurisdiction.  This means that the law to be applied is that of 
the forum state -- New Jersey.  While the state law to which we 
look includes New Jersey's choice of law rules, Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), neither party 
suggests any reason why a New Jersey court would apply other than 
its own law to this dispute and both, by the case law cited in 
their briefs, implicitly recognize New Jersey as providing the 
controlling law of contracts.  The parties do not contend, 
moreover, that New Jersey's contract law differs in any material 
way from the generally accepted principles of contract law 
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts or from the 
"traditional rules of contract interpretation" that we described 
in Teamsters Indus. Emp. Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, 
Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993).  Cyanamid successfully 
urged the district court to follow the principles which we 
articulated in Rolls-Royce and Fermenta relies heavily on those 
principles before us.  We there observed in the context of a 
collective bargaining agreement alleged to be ambiguous: 
  Although federal law governs the 
construction of collective bargaining 
agreements, traditional rules of contract 
interpretation apply when not inconsistent 
with federal law.  To decide whether a 
contract is ambiguous, we do not simply 
determine whether, from our point of view, 
the language is clear.  Rather, we "hear the 
proffer of the parties and determine if there 
[are] objective indicia that, from the 
linguistic reference point of the parties, 
the terms of the contract are susceptible of 
different meanings."  Sheet Metal Workers, 
  
949 F.2d at 1284 (brackets in original) 
(quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business 
Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 
1980)).  Before making a finding concerning 
the existence or absence of ambiguity, we 
consider the contract language, the meanings 
suggested by counsel, and the extrinsic 
evidence offered in support of each 
interpretation.  Id.; Mack Trucks, 917 F.2d 
at 111; see also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 223 cmt. b (1981) ("There is no 
requirement that an agreement be ambiguous 
before evidence of a course of dealing can be 
shown. . . .").  Extrinsic evidence may 
include the structure of the contract, the 
bargaining history, and the conduct of the 
parties that reflects their understanding of 
the contract's meaning.   
Id. at 135 (citations omitted). 
 These teachings appear to us to be consistent with 
those of New Jersey law.  In Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc. v. 
Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652 (N.J. 1953), the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey summarized this area of the law in the following terms: 
  Evidence of the circumstances is always 
admissible in aid of the interpretation of an 
integrated agreement.  This is so even when 
the contract on its face is free from 
ambiguity.  The polestar of construction is 
the intention of the parties to the contract 
as revealed by the language used, taken as an 
entirety; and, in the quest for the 
intention, the situation of the parties, the 
attendant circumstances, and the objects they 
were thereby striving to attain are 
necessarily to be regarded.  The admission of 
evidence of extrinsic facts is not for the 
purpose of changing the writing, but to 
secure light by which to measure its actual 
significance.  Such evidence is adducible 
only for the purpose of interpreting the 
writing--not for the purpose of modifying or 
enlarging or curtailing its terms, but to aid 
in determining the meaning of what has been 
said.  So far as the evidence tends to show, 
not the meaning of the writing, but an 
  
intention wholly unexpressed in the writing, 
it is irrelevant.  The judicial interpretive 
function is to consider what was written in 
the context of the circumstances under which 
it was written, and accord to the language a 
rational meaning in keeping with the 
expressed general purpose.  Casriel v. King, 
2 N.J. 45, 65 A.2d 514 (1949). 
Id. at 656. 
 It is important for present purposes to note that 
extrinsic evidence of the negotiations, conduct and other 
circumstances of the parties is important to a court's analysis 
of whether an agreement is ambiguous only to the extent, if any, 
that such evidence provides "objective indicia that, from the 
linguistic reference point of the parties, the terms of the 
contract are susceptible of different meanings."  Mellon Bank, 
N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 
1980).  That is, extrinsic evidence is permitted because the law 
recognizes that the meaning of words can depend on context, and 
what may seem unambiguous without context (or in the context that 
the judge may hypothesize, based on his or her own experience) 
may be ambiguous when understood from "the linguistic reference 
point of the parties."  Id.  See 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 542 (1960).  Cf. 4 Samuel Williston & Walter H. E. 
Jaeger, A Treatise on the Laws of Contracts § 601, at 310-11 (3d 
ed. 1961).  But the focus must remain on the language chosen by 
the parties, and a text unambiguous when accorded the commonly 
understood meaning of its words cannot be disregarded unless the 
extrinsic evidence is such as might cause a reasonable fact 
  
finder to understand the text differently.  See Mellon Bank, 619 
F.2d at 1011 & 1012 n.13. 
 The point is well illustrated by Mellon Bank, N.A. v. 
Aetna Business Credit, Inc., a case to which we looked in Rolls-
Royce for the "traditional rules of contract interpretation."  
Rolls-Royce, 989 F.2d at 135.  There, Mellon Bank and Aetna 
Business Credit were commercial lending institutions.  In the 
transaction giving rise to the dispute, Mellon was the 
construction lender and Aetna was the permanent lender.  Mellon 
alleged that Aetna breached their contract by refusing to 
purchase the construction loan held by Mellon.  Under the 
agreement, Aetna had "no obligation to acquire the construction 
loan from the construction lender in the event of . . . 
insolvency of the Borrower."  Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1006. 
 Mellon contended that the parties intended "insolvency" 
to mean that the borrower's liabilities exceeded its assets 
without reference to the liabilities or assets of the borrower 
that accrued from the particular project being financed.  The 
district court heard extrinsic evidence and held, based on the 
conduct of the parties during their negotiations, that Mellon's 
reading was "required by the clear allocation of lending risks 
between" the contracting parties.  Id. at 1008.  We described the 
district court's reasoning and the issue before us in the 
following terms: 
 The district court found that Aetna in 
analyzing the security for its permanent loan 
did not consider the borrowers' cash flow, 
did not condition its obligation upon any 
occupancy level, and therefore concluded 
  
"Aetna recognized that the financial 
transaction in question was not a basis for 
finding insolvency."  The district court 
cited no basis in the contract document or 
wording of the insolvency clause for its 
conclusion.  Our task is to decide if the 
district court permissibly used extrinsic 
evidence to interpret the contract and, if 
so, whether it drew the proper legal 
conclusions therefrom. 
Id. at 1009. 
 We reversed, holding as follows: 
 Although extrinsic evidence may be considered 
under proper circumstances, the parties 
remain bound by the appropriate objective 
definition of the words they use to express 
their intent. . . . 
 
  We have concluded that the district 
court here exceeded the permissible boundary 
of interpretation. . . .  When the district 
judge received Mellon's evidence it should 
have rejected it as insufficient to vary the 
meaning of a commercial term as well 
established as "insolvent."  In this case the 
district court added a term which made the 
condition a nullity.  It ruled that, although 
the solvency of the borrowers was a condition 
in the written contract, the fact that the 
borrowers' solvency was not significantly 
considered by Aetna in evaluating the take-
out loan minimized or nullified this clause 
of the contract.  
 
 . . . The fact that the insolvency of the 
borrowers was not significantly considered by 
Aetna in evaluating the take-out loan is 
immaterial given the expression of that 
concern in the written words of the contract. 
Id. at 1013-14.   
 Our approach in Mellon Bank is consistent with the law 
in New Jersey.  Although the New Jersey Supreme Court in Atlantic 
Northern Airlines extolled the use of extrinsic evidence to aid 
  
in ascertaining the intent of the parties, even when the terms of 
the instrument are otherwise unambiguous, it cautioned that such 
evidence may not be used "for the purpose of modifying or 
enlarging or curtailing" the terms of the contract.  With this 
understanding of the controlling law, we turn to examine the 
structure and text of the agreements and then to consider the 
extrinsic evidence offered by the parties. 
 
 III. 
 The preamble of the 1980 agreement clearly and tersely 
states Cyanamid's two objectives in entering the agreement:  
access to Diamond Shamrock's proprietary information and the 
right to use its regulatory authority: 
 DIAMOND SHAMROCK has developed or otherwise 
acquired certain proprietary information 
relating to the manufacture of an animal feed 
supplement and is the owner of an approved 
New Animal Drug Application (NADA) which 
permits the sale of such animal feed 
supplement; and 
 
 . . . CYANAMID desires to manufacture and 
sell such animal feed supplement and would 
like to obtain the right to utilize DIAMOND 
SHAMROCK's proprietary information and have 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK file supplemental NADA's to 
establish CYANAMID as an alternate 
manufacturing site and to designate CYANAMID 
as a distributor pursuant to 21 CFR 514.8. 
App. 151. 
 Two separate sections of the contract implement the 
transfer to Cyanamid of the commercial and regulatory rights it 
  
sought.  The first is Article 2.1, which is the focal point of 
this controversy.   
 Article 2.1 provides: 
  DIAMOND SHAMROCK grants to CYANAMID a 
non-exclusive license to use TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION to practice the LICENSED PROCESS 
and to make, use and sell PRODUCT under its 
own name and trademarks. 
App. 153-54.  The terms used in Article 2.1 are defined in 
Article 1.  "TECHNICAL INFORMATION" is defined as meaning "all 
information licensable by DIAMOND SHAMROCK as of the effective 
date of this Agreement and which relates to the practice of the 
LICENSED PROCESS or to the production and use of PRODUCT."  
"Licensed process" is defined as "DIAMOND SHAMROCK's process for 
the manufacture of an animal feed supplement presently sold under 
the trademark CSP 250 and comprising chlortetracycline, 
sulfathiazole and penicillin."  The term "product" refers to CSP 
250.  App. 152.  Thus, Article 2.1 grants commercial authority to 
Cyanamid to use Diamond Shamrock's proprietary information to 
manufacture, distribute and sell CSP 250.   
 Article 11.1, on the other hand, commits Diamond 
Shamrock to seek regulatory authority for Cyanamid to market CSP 
250.  That clause provides in part: 
  Promptly upon execution of this 
Agreement, DIAMOND SHAMROCK shall prepare and 
submit to the FDA supplemental new animal 
drug applications to establish CYANAMID's 
facility as an alternate manufacturing site 
and to designate CYANAMID as a distributor of 
PRODUCT under 21 CFR 514.8. 
  
App. 160.  This provision was, of course, a critical term of the 
agreement.  If Diamond Shamrock failed to obtain regulatory 
authority for Cyanamid by December 31, 1982, Article 11.2 
entitled Cyanamid to terminate the agreement. 
 The dichotomy between commercial and regulatory rights 
reflected in the preamble and in Articles 2.1 and 11.1 is 
important for present purposes because the scope of the perpetual 
license Cyanamid claims to have received by virtue of the 1983 
amendment is defined in that amendment and Article 9.2 of the 
original agreement solely by reference to the rights conferred by 
Article 2.  As we have noted, Article 9.2 grants Cyanamid an 
option to obtain upon the termination of the agreement a 
perpetual "license . . . under TECHNICAL INFORMATION as shall 
have been licensed hereunder to CYANAMID."  It was this perpetual 
license that Cyanamid acquired in 1983 when it was granted a 
perpetual "license . . . under TECHNICAL INFORMATION as shall 
have been licensed under the Agreement," i.e., a perpetual 
license to use "all information licensable by Diamond Shamrock as 
of [July 23, 1980] which relates to the practice of [its 
manufacturing process for CSP 250] or to the production and use 
of [CSP 250]." 
 The 1983 amendment provides that, save for the grant of 
this perpetual license of Diamond Shamrock's proprietary 
information, all other terms and conditions of the original 
agreement were to remain unchanged.  Since one such term and 
condition was the five year limit on the rights originally 
conveyed, this meant that only the perpetual license of 
  
proprietary information was to survive beyond June of 1987.  It 
necessarily follows that any right Cyanamid had after 1987 had to 
be a right conferred by Article 2.1. 
 Cyanamid insists that, when Diamond Shamrock conveyed 
in Article 2.1 a "license to use TECHNICAL INFORMATION to 
practice the LICENSED PROCESS and to make, use and sell PRODUCT 
under its own name and trademarks," Diamond Shamrock conveyed a 
right to reference its NADA.  We agree with the district court, 
however.  If the quoted words and those of the remainder of the 
agreement are given their commonly understood meaning, Article 
2.1 simply does not make such a grant. 
 When the definitions of the defined terms are inserted 
in the grant evidenced by Article 2.1, one has a straightforward 
conveyance of a license to use Diamond Shamrock's proprietary 
information to practice its process and make, use and sell its 
product -- such proprietary information consisting of "all 
information licensable by Diamond Shamrock as of [July 23, 1980] 
which relates to the practice of [its manufacturing process for 
CSP 250] or to the production and use of [CSP 250]."  This 
conveyance is consistent with the dichotomy we have previously 
identified in the preamble and between the grants made in 
Articles 2.1 and 11.1.  As the district court stressed, if 
Article 2.1 gave Cyanamid not only a commercial license to make, 
use and sell CSP 250 using Diamond Shamrock's proprietary 
information, but also a right to use the regulatory authority 
Diamond Shamrock hoped to obtain for Cyanamid, Article 11 would 
serve no purpose.  It is a well settled principle, however, that 
  
a court should read a contract so as to give all its terms their 
intended effect.  See J. L. Davis & Associates v. Heidler, 622 
A.2d 923, 927 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (disapproving of a 
"reading of [a] contract [which] would nullify its very terms and 
render [a] provision useless"); Goldberg v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co. of New York, 188 A.2d 188, 191 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1963) ("Effect, if possible, will be given to all parts of the 
instrument . . . .); 3 Corbin, supra, § 549, at 183 (stating that 
the "legal effects" of the terms of a contract are to be 
"determined as a whole"). 
 Moreover, as the district court also noted, an 
understanding of Article 2.1 that includes a conveyance of 
regulatory rights as well as a commercial license to use 
proprietary information is inconsistent with its time focus.  
Article 2.1 effects a conveyance of rights Diamond Shamrock 
possessed as of July 23, 1980.  As is recognized in Article 11, 
Diamond Shamrock had no authority on that date to give Cyanamid 
the right to legally sell CSP 250 in the United States.  This 
could be accomplished only by Diamond Shamrock's taking the steps 
necessary to secure authority for Cyanamid from the FDA, 
authority which, as the escape clause demonstrates, the parties 
knew might be obtained, if at all, only after the passage of a 
substantial period of time. 
 Cyanamid correctly points out that the reading of 
Article 2.1 which Fermenta champions and we adopt is not entirely 
consistent with the district court's reading of that provision.  
The district court interpreted Article 2.1 to convey two rights, 
  
a "license to use TECHNICAL INFORMATION to practice the LICENSED 
PROCESS" and a license "to make, use and sell PRODUCT under its 
own name and trademarks."  As previously indicated, we, on the 
other hand, read both the "to practice" clause and the "to make, 
use and sell" clause as modifying "license to use TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION."  The latter reading seems to us the more natural 
one since Cyanamid was going to use its own name and trademarks, 
Diamond Shamrock had no patent on CSP 250, and the only non-
regulatory basis for excluding Cyanamid from competing in the CSP 
250 market was the rights Diamond Shamrock possessed in its 
proprietary information.  We do not, however, regard our 
difference with the district court as material in the present 
context.  Even if there be an ambiguity as to what the "make, use 
and sell" clause modifies, that ambiguity does not render the 
text of the agreement and the 1983 amendment ambiguous as to 
whether Cyanamid possesses a perpetual right to reference Diamond 
Shamrock's NADA.  As the district court's opinion demonstrates, 
this is so because the scope of the only perpetual license 
acquired by Cyanamid is defined solely by reference to the 
"TECHNICAL INFORMATION . . . licensed under the Agreement."  
Thus, even if, like the district court, one breaks Article 2.1's 
conveyance up into two segments, it is only the first, TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION segment that is the subject of the perpetual license.  
TECHNICAL INFORMATION is a defined term and, as we have 
demonstrated, its meaning cannot be stretched to include a 
commitment on Diamond Shamrock's part to seek FDA authority for 
Cyanamid in the future. 
  
 
 IV. 
 The extrinsic evidence of intent heard by the district 
court does not transform Article 2.1's straightforward grant of a 
license to make, use and sell CSP 250 utilizing proprietary 
information into something else.  Indeed, that evidence tends to 
support the reading of the agreements that accords the words 
their ordinarily accepted meaning. 
 When one who is unfamiliar with the background reads 
the agreement and the 1983 amendment, an important question 
arises: Why would Cyanamid want to pay for a perpetual license to 
use Diamond Shamrock's proprietary information concerning CPS 250 
if it anticipated that its right to market CPS 250 under the 
supplemental NADA would expire in mid-1987?  The extrinsic 
evidence supplies the answer.  First, FDA authority is required 
only to market in the United States.  Second, Cyanamid could 
apply for its own NADA and sell a product that was similar to CPS 
250, and it intended to do so.  Both the correspondence between 
the parties during the negotiation of the agreement and the 
testimony of Cyanamid's employees indicate that during the 
relevant period it was pursuing its own plan to secure 
independent marketing authority from the FDA for a product 
consisting of aureomycin, sulfathiazole and penicillin.  Thus, 
Cyanamid did not contemplate having to reference Diamond 
Shamrock's NADA indefinitely.  It was buying time through these 
agreements insofar as regulatory authority was concerned, but it 
  
wanted continuing authority to use the proprietary information it 
learned from Diamond Shamrock under the 1980 agreement.   
 The record also establishes that prosecution of an 
application for a NADA is time consuming and costs well in excess 
of $1,000,000.  Against this background, the structure of the 
consideration to be paid by Cyanamid provides further evidence 
that the agreement was deliberately drafted to treat the 
supplemental NADA as a right separate and apart from the 
TECHNICAL INFORMATION.  The single most important part of the 
agreement was the grant of regulatory authority, without which 
Cyanamid could terminate the agreement.  Under Article 3 of the 
agreement, in addition to the $150,000 advance royalty (which was 
creditable against 50 percent of earned royalties), Cyanamid was 
committed to pay earned royalties out of the proceeds of its 
sales.  Diamond Shamrock was entitled to a minimum earned royalty 
of $62,500, in addition to the full advance royalty (for a total 
of a minimum of $212,500), within three years of the approval of 
the supplemental NADA; if it did not receive this sum, it could 
terminate the agreement under Article 8.  Of course, given the 
potential volume of Cyanamid's sales, Diamond Shamrock could earn 
a much larger sum in royalties.  Under Article 9.2, however, the 
costs to Cyanamid for a permanent license to use the TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION was only $25,000.3  Based both on the parties' 
                     
3
.  The $87,500 price paid by Cyanamid as consideration for the 
Amendment consisted of two components: (1) the $25,000 provided 
for by Article 9.2 of the Agreement in exchange for a perpetual 
license to the TECHNICAL INFORMATION, and (2) $62,500 for the 
royalties which Cyanamid would have owed under Article 8 of the 
Agreement on its minimum sales obligation of $5 million.  The 
  
understanding of the time and expense of prosecuting a NADA 
application and on the amount of the royalties specified in the 
agreement for the rights Cyanamid was to possess over the limited 
period of the agreement, it seems highly unlikely that Diamond 
Shamrock would have been willing to convey for $25,000 a 
perpetual license that would include both the right to use its 
proprietary information and the right to use its regulatory 
authority.  Stated conversely, the economics of the matter at 
least suggest that the option to buy a perpetual license to use 
TECHNICAL INFORMATION for $25,000 did not include the use of the 
supplemental NADA in perpetuity. 
 In these respects, the extrinsic evidence confirms that 
according the terms of the agreements their plain meaning makes 
commercial sense. 
 The extrinsic evidence stressed most heavily by 
Cyanamid as throwing light on the intention of the parties is the 
conduct of Fermenta's employees in the period following July of 
1987.  Shortly after the execution of the 1983 amendment, SDS 
Biotech acquired Diamond Shamrock's animal health business.  SDS 
Biotech, in turn, was acquired by Fermenta in October of 1985, 
after the perpetual, paid-up license had been purchased with a 
(..continued) 
$62,500 was calculated as follows:  Article 3 of the Agreement 
provided that earned royalties were to be calculated at the rate 
of 2.5 percent on the first $10,000,000 of net sales, and at the 
rate of one percent thereafter.  Therefore, on $5,000,000, the 
royalty would be $125,000 ($5,000,000 x 2.5%).  However, Article 
3 also provided for an advance royalty of $150,000 creditable 
against 50 percent of earned royalties.  Accounting for that 
credit, the royalty remaining to be paid on $5,000,000 minimum 
sales would be $62,500.   
  
lump sum payment, but still during the five year term of the 
original agreement.  Thus, after Fermenta succeeded to Diamond 
Shamrock's rights, it was never entitled to receive royalties 
under the agreement and it received none.  When June of 1987 came 
and the original five year term of the agreement expired, 
Cyanamid continued to sell CPS 250 under its own name and 
trademark.  Over the six years from June of 1987 to October of 
1993, Fermenta did not protest Cyanamid's continuing sales.  The 
explanation for this failure to protest, which was uncontradicted 
in the record and accepted by the district court, was given by 
Fermenta's general counsel.  He testified that over the years, he 
and others were aware of the existence of the contract and of 
Cyanamid's use of the supplemental NADA because of inquiries from 
the FDA about that use.  However, no one at Fermenta read the 
contract and focused on its terms until a more serious regulatory 
problem arose in the Fall of 1993, at which point Fermenta's 
general counsel reviewed the contract in its entirety.  
 The significance of Fermenta's failure to protest is 
diminished by the fact that Diamond Shamrock, rather than 
Fermenta, negotiated the original agreement and the 1983 
amendment and oversaw its execution during the period when 
Cyanamid was paying royalties.  Nevertheless, we acknowledge that 
the evidence does not rule out the possibility that the failure 
to protest may have been attributable in part to someone at 
Fermenta having read the agreements at some point after June of 
1987 and having concluded that they conveyed to Cyanamid the 
right to continue to use the supplemental NADA.  Even if this 
  
occurred, however, we would not regard it as a justification for 
us to read the agreements of the parties in a different way.  
Like the parties in Mellon Bank, the parties here used words 
quite common in agreements of this kind with generally accepted 
meanings.  Like Aetna's pre-contract conduct in Mellon Bank, 
Fermenta's post-contract conduct does not suggest that the 
parties had an unusual "linguistic reference."  As a result, we 
agree with the district court that a reasonable person reading 
the agreements against the background of the extrinsic evidence 
could not find them susceptible of a reading that would bestow 
upon Cyanamid a perpetual right to use the supplemental NADA. 
 
 V. 
 For these reasons, the judgment of the district court 
will be affirmed.4 
                     
4
.  On appeal, Cyanamid also argues that the regulatory reference 
right, once granted, can only be extinguished by the FDA.  
However, Cyanamid failed to raise this argument before the 
district court, thus waiving its right to argue it on appeal.  
"It is well established that failure to raise an issue in the 
district court constitutes a waiver of the argument."  Brenner v. 
Local 514, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298 (3d Cir. 1991). 
